About the author
American economist (b. 1971), professor at George Mason University and a prominent libertarian writer. Drawing on public-choice economics and behavioural research, Caplan argues across his books for skepticism about democratic decision-making and for the superiority of markets; The Myth of the Rational Voter is his best-known work.
Synopsis
Caplan distinguishes voter irrationality from mere ignorance, identifying systematic biases — anti-market, anti-foreign, make-work, and pessimistic — that lead the public to favour economically harmful policies. Because a single vote almost never decides an election, he argues, voters can indulge comfortable false beliefs at no personal cost ('rational irrationality'), so democracies predictably enact worse economic policy than the experts would.
Core passage idea
Paraphrase · Modern copyrighted workCaplan argues that voters are not just ignorant but systematically irrational about economics — and that because one vote rarely matters, people indulge their biases at the ballot box at no cost to themselves.
Caplan's 'rational irrationality' explains how democracies can persistently choose bad policy without anyone behaving foolishly in their own life: the price of believing comfortable falsehoods at the ballot box is essentially zero. It is a public-choice case for relying more on markets and less on majorities.
To avoid a bubble
Pair with defenders of democracy and collective wisdom (from Dewey to theorists of deliberation and the 'wisdom of crowds') who argue that Caplan underrates voters, overrates economists' consensus, and would replace democratic accountability with rule by experts and markets.
Reading note
Clear and argumentative. Read it alongside Brennan's Against Democracy as the economic wing of the case against democratic faith, and against defenders of collective wisdom and deliberation.
Best paired with
Jason Brennan, Against Democracy; Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.