ContemporaryAdvancedBook

The Morality of Freedom

Joseph Raz

Perfectionist liberalism

One of the most important works of liberal political philosophy since Rawls, and the major statement of 'perfectionist' liberalism. Raz argues that the point of political freedom is personal autonomy — the capacity to author one's own life — and that autonomy requires not just non-interference but a rich array of valuable options and the conditions to choose among them. Strikingly, he concludes that a liberal state need not be neutral about the good life, but may legitimately help its citizens lead autonomous, worthwhile lives. A deep challenge to neutralist liberalism from within.

About the author

Israeli-British legal and moral philosopher (1939–2022), professor at Oxford and Columbia and one of the most important philosophers of law and politics of his era. A student of H. L. A. Hart, Raz developed influential theories of authority, practical reason, and law; The Morality of Freedom is his major work of political philosophy.

Synopsis

Raz develops a theory in which autonomy — being part-author of one's own life through choices among valuable options — is the core liberal value. Freedom matters because it serves autonomy; rights are grounded in the interests they protect; and political authority is justified when following it helps people conform to reasons that apply to them (the 'service conception'). Because autonomy needs valuable options, the state may legitimately foster the conditions and culture in which autonomous lives are possible, abandoning strict neutrality.

Core passage idea

Paraphrase · Modern copyrighted work

Raz argues that the value of freedom lies in personal autonomy — authoring one's own life — and that since autonomy requires an array of genuinely valuable options, a liberal state may legitimately help create the conditions for worthwhile lives rather than remain neutral about the good.

By grounding liberalism in autonomy rather than neutrality, Raz licenses a perfectionist state that actively supports the conditions of valuable choice. It is a powerful internal challenge to the Rawlsian and libertarian insistence that government stay neutral about how people should live.

To avoid a bubble

Pair with the neutralist liberalism of Rawls and the strong anti-paternalism of libertarians (Nozick), both of which reject Raz's claim that the state may promote particular conceptions of the good — even in the name of autonomy.

Reading note

Rigorous analytic philosophy; the accounts of autonomy, the 'service conception' of authority, and perfectionism are the core. Read it against Rawls's neutralist liberalism and Nozick's libertarianism.

Best paired with

John Rawls, Political Liberalism; Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty.

Find this book

Search onlineSearch libraryBuy on Amazon